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ABSTRACT
This study updates and expands upon the existing work on the
accuracy of the IPF’s Consensus Forecasts. The paper evaluates
the extent to which the consensus forecasts were able to pre-
dict the relative performance. It also assesses the accuracy of
implied yield forecasts and concludes that failure in yield fore-
casting is the main source of failure in forecasts of capital
growth and total returns. A high level of agreement between
the actual and forecasted sector rankings was found. Evidence
of a pessimism bias was identified. Yield forecasts are consis-
tently found to perform worst using a range of forecast perfor-
mance metrics.
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I Introduction
This paper investigates the accuracy of the Investment Property Forum (IPF)1 Consensus
Forecasts in the UK commercial real estate market. Given the global significance of real
estate as an asset class and a common perception that the market is characterised by
inefficiency, the body of knowledge on the performance of real estate forecasts is
surprisingly thin. For institutional real estate investors, forecasts of future rents, vacancy
rates, yields2 etc. and returns for assets across classes are key inputs into decisions about
stock selection and asset allocation. Consequently, the ability of real estate forecasters to
provide investment organisations with forecasts that add value should be a concern to
both users and producers of real estate forecasts. There is a substantial real estate
forecasting ‘industry’ with most institutional investors, their advisers and specialists
producing regular forecasts. Beginning in 1999, the IPF Consensus Forecasts have
provided a rich source of data on market expectations of real estate forecasters in the UK.
Building on previous research that has evaluated the accuracy of the IPF Consensus
Forecasts, this study contributes to the body of knowledge on the topic in three ways.
Firstly, it updates and expands existing research on the performance of the IPF’s
Consensus Forecasts of rental growth, capital growth and total return applying a range
of error metrics and other accuracy measures commonly used in forecast evaluation.
Previous studies focussed only at the All Property level. This study now includes sector
level forecasts and expands the sample period. Secondly, the availability of sector level
forecasts presented an opportunity to assess the extent to which the consensus forecasts
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were able to predict the relative performance. Finally, since it has been argued that
failures in forecasting real estate returns are caused largely by limitations in yield
forecasting, a further contribution of the research is that it evaluates the performance
of yield forecasts implied in the relationship between the explicit forecasts of rental and
capital growth.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In the next section, focussing
mainly on the most closely related previous research, a brief discussion of the literature
on the topic is provided. This is followed by a description and short evaluation of the
metrics used to measure the accuracy of forecasts. The third section discusses the data.
The fourth section describes and discusses the results of the forecasting performance
tests. Finally, conclusions and implications for practice are drawn.
II Previous research
The scale of the empirical research on forecast accuracy in numerous fields precludes
a comprehensive review of the literature in this context. However, it is important to
acknowledge that it is widely accepted that uncertainty and disagreement are intrinsic to
economic forecasting. One source of forecast uncertainty can lie in the forecast modelling
process. The innate modelling problem in forecasting is largely summed up by George
Box’s widely cited dictum that ‘[T]he most that can be expected from any model is that it
can supply a useful approximation to reality: All models are wrong; some models are
useful’ (Box, Hunter, & Hunter, 1978, 440). In the context of economic forecasts, Hendry
and Clements (2003, 303) echo George Box when they argue that ‘all econometric models
are mis-specified, and all economies have been subject to unanticipated shifts’.
In economic forecasting, Hendry and Clements (2003) argue that it is seldom fore-
casting models that are the main source of forecast failure. Although failure may be
partially caused by weak theory and incorrect observations, they argue that it mainly
arises from structural instability in the underlying causal relationships. Unanticipated
shocks, in particular, can lead to systematic forecast failure. Structural breaks – sudden
large changes, invariably unanticipated – have been a major source of forecast failure. It is
also worth pointing out the inherent smoothing that is a feature of econometric models.
Hendry (2003) highlights the intrinsic averaging that occurs in econometric modelling
which averages over likely future shocks and produces signals of the ‘average future’.
The prevalence of unanticipated shocks can mean that, model specification can be
irrelevant to forecast performance with well-specified models outperformed by poorly
specified models in forecasting competitions. In line with findings outside the real estate
sector, real estate researchers have found that in many instances, simple forecasts (e.g. via
naïve predictors) to be more accurate than using complex econometric models (Chaplin,
1998, 2000; Wilson et al, 2000). Further, in macro-economic forecasts, non-causal
models often tend to dominate causal models (Clements & Hendry, 1999).
The optimal response to the challenges of incorporating structural breaks in fore-
casting models has been judgemental overlay so that economic and financial forecasts
are often the product of a blend of quantitative modelling and qualitative judgements.
Focussing on the UK commercial real estate forecasting sector, Watkins, White, and
Keskin (2012) state that most forecasters cite mood and sentiment as the main reasons
for making such overlay adjustments. There has been growing research on the
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information content of sentiment in the forecasting process (see Marcato and Nanda,
2016) Whilst poor data, model mis-specification etc. can be categorised as honest
mistakes, there are a number of long-recognised behavioural biases and agency pro-
blems in forecasting.
Batchelor (2007) provided an overview of how different informational environments
and incentive structures can bias individual financial and economic forecasts. Gallimore
and McAllister (2005) found that real estate forecasters in the UK often self-censored or
were censored when forecasting models generate contentious or conspicuous forecasts.
In the US commercial real estate market, Ling (2005) found evidence of adaptive rather
than rational expectations in RERC’s survey of expected sector performance. It was found
that consensus predictions were correlated with market returns in the two years prior to
the survey. No correlation between the prediction of the RERC survey respondents and
actual return performance was identified. It was concluded that investment strategies
based on the specific measure of consensus expectation would not have improved total
return performance – the criterion of prime importance to most institutional investors.
There have been a number of previous studies that have evaluated the accuracy of the
IPF Consensus Forecasts of rental growth, capital growth and total returns. Two studies
focused on individual forecaster disagreement rather than the performance of the con-
sensus forecasts (see McAllister, Newell, & Matysiak, 2006; Papastamos, Stevenson and
Matysiak 2015). Focussing on a comparison of the performance of various econometric
models with the IPF Consensus Forecasts of rental growth and total return for the UK
market for period 1999–2004, Tsolacos (2006) found no consistent performance differ-
ences in forecasting ability between the consensus and the output of relatively simple
regression models. Again, over a relatively short sample period (1999–2004) McAllister,
Newell, and Matysiak (2008) found that the consensus forecasts were more successful in
terms of forecasting rental compared to capital returns. They concluded that the fact that
capital growth consensus forecasts tended to track rental growth forecasts probably
reflected the challenges of forecasting yields.
Drawing upon a longer sample period (1999–2011) using similar data and methods to
McAllister et al. (2008), Papastamos et al. (2015) also concluded that, compared to capital
growth and total return forecasts, rental growth forecasts performed much better.
However, both studies seemed to have used a flawed approach to comparing the fore-
casting performance of the consensus compared to naïve forecasts. Their focus was on
the performance of individual forecasters compared to naïve forecasts for individual
years rather than comparing the forecasts of the consensus and naïve forecasts for the
relevant sample periods. This suggests that the performance of the consensus relative to
simple naïve forecasts has not been effectively evaluated in the existing research.
Nevertheless, both also identified large forecasting errors in capital returns which they
also attribute to the difficulties of forecasting yields.
Bond and Mitchell (2011) compared the accuracy of implied capital returns from
real estate derivative prices to the IPF Consensus Forecasts for the period 2006 to 2009.
Acknowledging the short sampling period, consequent small number of observations
and looking only at the mean absolute error as a measure of forecast uncertainty, they
found evidence that the (implied) forecasts in the swaps market for one year ahead
were marginally more accurate than consensus forecasts with the latter performing
better over two and three year horizons. It is also worth noting that there has been
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a longstanding body of work comparing the accuracy of different real estate forecasting
models assuming either perfect foresight for independent variables or common
sources of forecasts (see Tsolacos, 2006; Stevenson & McGarth, 2003; Chaplin, 1998).
Whilst there is a longstanding body of work modelling the determinants of real estate
market yields, the literature on yield forecasting is much thinner. At the individual asset
level, a forecast of the exit yield is a significant variable in estimating future returns.
Projections of total returns at the individual property, portfolio or index level require
estimates of yield changes. Watkins et al. (2012) identified a range of potential yield
forecasting techniques. These included autoregressive integrated moving average models
(ARIMA), a vector error correction mechanism and vector autoregressive models relat-
ing yields to lagged yields, rental growth, bond yields and stock market variables. More
recent studies also apply an error correction framework.
Drawing upon semi-structured interviews with forecasters, Gallimore and McAllister
(2003) found that they generally regarded yield forecasting as inherently more difficult
than rent forecasting. It was found that real estate market forecasters had little confidence
in their ability to provide reliable yield forecasts using econometric techniques and, given
this lack of confidence, that judgement seemed to be a much more important element of
the yield forecasting process. There seems to be only one study that has evaluated yield
forecasts. For the period 2001–2011 in Australia, Perera, Higgins, and Wong (2018)
included ‘six months out’ real estate yield forecasts as well as for a range of economic and
other real estate market variables in their forecast accuracy study. Whilst there is limited
detail and discussion of the findings on yield forecasts in their paper, their results suggest
extremely poor performance of yield forecasts compared to forecasts of other economic
and real estate market variables.
III Measuring forecast performance
The terminology regarding the measurement of forecast uncertainty has echoed much of
the debate on appraisal uncertainty and smoothing. Similar distinctions are drawn
between random variations in the actual and predicted outcomes (error) and systematic
tendencies towards optimism or pessimism (bias). ‘Forecast smoothing’ is a well-
established stylised fact. In the 1980s, Nordhaus (1987) speculated that the commonly
observed lower volatility in forecasts, relative to actual outcomes, is due to behavioural
and incentives structures factors such as the need to reach a consensus and to maintain
forecast credibility by avoiding major ‘jumps’. The previous research by McAllister et al.
(2008) and Papastamos et al. (2015) found that forecasted time series of rental and capital
growth tended to be much less volatile than the actual time series.
A common problem in comparing the performance of forecasts for different vari-
ables or different markets is differences in scale and other attributes of the variables
forecasted. For instance, for MSCI IPD, the average annual growth in market rental
levels for the retail sector between 1981 and 2017 has been 4.1% per annum with
a standard deviation of 5.2%. Given that a high auto-correlation coefficient implies
predictability, this coefficient is very high at 0.83. Capital growth on average has been
3.8% per annum with a standard deviation of 8.5%. The auto-correlation coefficient is
much lower at 0.42 which is consistent with a more volatile and less smooth time series.
Despite their similar average rates of growth, the different levels of variation in the
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series and different levels of ‘predictability’ (as proxied by the level of auto-correlation)
suggest that comparing ‘raw’ forecasts of capital growth with forecasts of rental growth
may not be an appropriate like for like comparison. In turn, different real estate sectors
or sub-markets can have different long-term rates of growth, variability and auto-
correlation. The yield time series tend to be at the other end of the scale relative to
capital growth. The average equivalent yield for the retail sector between 1981 and 2017
was 7.1% with a standard deviation of 1.1% and an auto-correlation coefficient of 0.86.
Hence, it is worth bearing in mind the different attributes of the different variables to
be forecasted when evaluating forecast performance and evaluating measures of forecast
performance.
Typically, forecast accuracy measures are classified into two types. The first category is
independent measures, i.e. forecast performance measures are solely a function of the
forecast under evaluation. The second category is relative measures that compare fore-
casts to a benchmark forecast, e.g. a forecast of no change. The most commonly applied
independent error metric measures are Mean Error, Mean Absolute Error, square root of
the Mean Squared Error. Theil’s U2 statistic is a common measure of relative perfor-
mance which can be decomposed into three parts namely bias, variance and covariance
proportions. These measures have been covered in detail in previous papers. Further
information on their calculation is provided in Appendix 1.
Since the contribution of forecasts to organisational decision-making will depend
on the specific application of forecasts in the organisation, forecast evaluation is to
some extent an inherently subjective process. In terms of forecast evaluation, Granger
& Pesaran, 2000, 538) have advocated a decision theoretical approach where there is
a ‘consideration of the linkage between the modeler who produces forecasts and the
decision-maker who consumes them’. The most appropriate measure of accuracy is
therefore dependent upon the utility of the forecast to the forecast user. Whilst it is
possible to focus on loss functions, these also are typically user specific. In practice,
Gallimore and McAllister (2003) found that UK real estate forecasters generally
perceived forecast success and failure in relative rather than absolute terms.
Forecasters placed importance on being correct about the performance rankings rather
than getting the absolute numbers right. There is a need for some caution in general-
ising about whether all or most real estate forecasters now regard relative rather than
absolute performance as more important. The Gallimore and McAllister (2003) study
was qualitative and essentially exploratory. The composition of the real estate invest-
ment sector has changed significantly over the last two decades. Some investors or
funds can have specialised sector and/or geographical foci or, alternatively, may be
diversified internationally. As discussed further below, there are incentives for fore-
casting organisations to strategically bias outputs. Nevertheless, the data do provide an
opportunity to evaluate the relative performance of the consensus forecasts.
In order to evaluate the extent to which forecasters agree in terms of ranking the
various sectors, we use Kendall’s coefficient of concordance (also known as Kendall’s
W). This is commonly used for assessing agreement among raters. Kendall’s W ranges
from 0 (no agreement) in ranking to 1 (complete agreement). If W is 0, then rankings
may be regarded as being random with intermediate values suggesting a higher of
lower level of agreement among the various sets of rankings. In this specific case for
rankings of the sectors (Office, Retail, Shopping Centres etc.), Kendall’s W is used to
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measure the extent to which the predicted sector rankings of the consensus ‘agree with’
the actual observed rankings. Kendall’s W is calculated as
W ¼ 12S
m2 n3  nð Þ (1)
Wherem is the number of rankers and n is the number of categories being ranked. In this
study we investigate two cases where for every year there are two rankers; the actual
outcomes and either the consensus forecasts or the ARMA forecasts ranking eight sectors
(categories) for four variables. The relative performance of consensus with regard to
ARMA forecasts is assessed by comparing each year’s Kendall’s W values across the four
variables. S represents the sum of the squared differences between each rank Ri where i
= 1:n and the mean rank for each category.
IV Data
The core data on the consensus forecasts has been provided by the IPF. Whilst there are
numerous potential permutations of forecasts that could be evaluated, we focus here only
on the one year ahead consensus forecasts from 2006 until 2017. For nearly two decades,
the IPF have been surveying forecasters employed by a broad range of institutional
investors and their advisors classified into property advisors (including research consul-
tancies) and fund/investment managers.3 Surveyed four times per annum (in February,
May, August and November), respondents are asked to provide forecasts of the annual
rate of rental growth, capital value growth and total returns until the end of current
calendar year, until the end of the subsequent calendar year and until the end of the fifth
calendar year. For instance, in the August 2018 survey, respondents are asked to estimate
the average rate of rental growth per annum for the period from January 2018 until
December 2018, December 2019 and December 2022. We focus only on the February
forecasts which approximates to a one year horizon producing one annual observation for
each sector for each of the 13 years. In addition to UK All Property, forecasts are requested
for seven sectors – Standard Retail, Shopping Centres, Retail Warehouses, Offices, City
Offices, West End Offices and Industrial. It is also worth noting that there is overlap
between some of the sectors. Most obviously, the All Property indices are composed of
assets in the other seven sectors. In addition, the assets in the City and West End sectors
comprise a substantial proportion of the Office sector.
Due to mergers and acquisitions and new entrants, re-entrants etc. into the real estate
advisory services and fund management sectors, the number of contributing firms has
changed from forecast period to forecast period. As financialisation and globalisation of
commercial real estate markets has deepened over the last two decades, a broader user base
of real estate forecasts has emerged. Baym and Hartzell (2012, 9) referred to the creation of
‘a more complex industry structure and a confusion of ownership and management’. This
increased complexity creates challenges in generalising about what constitutes ‘practice’ in
terms of the production and use of forecasts. Recent empirical evidence on investment and
forecasting practice for commercial real estate markets is thin. However, there can be little
doubt that investing institutions now have access to a range of paid for and ‘free’ forecasts
for the various MSCI market sectors. Many large fund management organisations will
internally produce their own ‘house’ forecasts and/or subscribe to external forecast
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providers. It can be more nuanced. For instance, a fund management organisation may
subscribe to an external forecasting service but ask the real estate forecasting organisation
to customise forecasts to their specific expectations about, for example, interest rate
movements or GDP growth or a subscriber may simply subjectively adjust externally
provided forecasts.Whilst the main applications of forecasts still seem to be asset allocation
and stock selection, there is anecdotal evidence that the nascent real estate derivatives
market has increased market sensitivity about the production and release of the consensus
forecasts. In context of this research, the IPF Consensus Forecasts at sector level are likely
to be applied for strategic and tactical asset allocation. More localised forecasts or sig-
nificant adjustment to wider sector forecasts are usually needed for specific submarkets and
assets.
In addition, there are other producers of commercial real estate forecasts external to
fund managers. Watkins et al. (2012) stated that commercial real estate forecasts are
produced by combining econometric predictions with a more subjective market overlay
process. There may be different incentives to herd and/or to strategically bias their
forecasts between the different forecasters and organisations. Real estate advisors and
research consultancies produce forecasts that are sold externally. Advisors may also
publish some of their forecasts essentially as part of marketing their services. There is
anecdotal evidence that institutional investors believe that the forecasts of the global real
estate advisory firms are optimistically biased for fear that ‘negative’ forecasts could
jeopardise transactions.4 Watkins et al. (2012) noted that organisations that publish
forecasts for external use tend to employ models where the assumptions and methods
are explicit since, even if it is acknowledged that the forecast is expected to be incorrect,
the outputs can be more readily justified.
To assess forecast performance, the actual outcome is the growth rate or return for the
relevant annual index produced by MSCI (formerly produced by Investment Property
Databank (IPD)). In terms of evaluating forecasting performance, the relevant MSCI
market or sector index is taken as the actual outcome. The performance data is available
for the period 1981–2017. This paper investigates the forecasting performance (forecast
error measures are outlined in Appendix 1) as the difference between the consensus
forecasts and the actual outcomes. Data on the IPF’s Consensus Forecasts are taken from
2006 because the sector composition of the forecast survey has been stable since then
providing a consistent time series.
In addition, we use the actual series to estimate one year ahead forecasts with simple
trend models. In previous research on the IPF Consensus Forecasts, the benchmark naïve
forecast against which the performance of forecasts was compared was typically a ‘no
change’ or ‘same as last period’ forecast. Given that this is a rather undemanding hurdle
to jump over, some basic trend-based forecasts have been made as a forecasting perfor-
mance benchmark against which to compare the IPF Consensus Forecasts. We under-
took preliminary analysis of the MSCI data series for three different periods namely
1981–2005; 1981–2010 and 1981–2017. These comprised of Augmented Dicky-Fuller
(ADF) tests and Autocorrelation and Partial Autocorrelation Function (ACF – PACF)
graph analysis. They indicated that, for the majority of the series, the predominant
structure was a second order autoregressive one (AR2). This was the predominant
specification used to produce the alternative forecasts against which to compare the
consensus forecasts.
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The MSCI data analysed here were the changes for all the variables under investiga-
tion – effectively first differences of the log transformed original quantities of each series.
Hence, the integration term D in the standard annotation of ARIMA (p, D, q) models was
not applicable in any of the models estimated. We performed Ljung-Box and Engel
heteroscedasticity tests with the 32 actual series for the periods 1981–2005 and
1981–2017 and found that both autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity were present.
We repeated the tests after fitting the best performing models finding no significant
correlation or conditional heteroscedasticity in the (standardised) residuals with the
exception of two cases in the 1981–2017 series. By and large, the best fitted models
were second order autoregressive AR(2) with the exception of rental growth in Retail
Warehouses, AR(1). Sector series for equivalent yield were generally dominated by AR(2)
models with the exception of years 2007 and 2008 where AR(3) specifications provided
the best fit alternative (see Appendix 2 and Appendix 3 for further details).
As noted earlier, in this context there is a specific focus on implied yield forecasts and
on the ability of real estate forecasters to predict relative sector performance. Whilst there
are no publicly available forecasts of yields, with an element of approximation implied
forecasts of yield shifts5 can be ‘backed-out’ of the relationship between capital and rental
growth forecasts. The underlying rationale is that, since capital values are fundamentally
a function of rents and yields, assuming stable vacancy rates and reversionary periods, at
the aggregate index level it is only changes in rental growth and yields that will produce
changes to the capital value of the index.
The intuition here is that, if a forecaster is forecasting rents to grow by 10% in a year
and is also forecasting capital value growth to be 10% in that year, it is expected that the
increase in Market Rent by itself will produce all the capital value growth and it can be
inferred that no change in yield is being forecasted. However, if the forecast was for
capital value growth to be 15% and rental growth to be 10%, then there is an implied
forecast of a (downward) yield shift that is producing the added 5% capital growth.
Hence, when rental and capital growth forecasts are known, implicit forecasts for future
yields can be estimated. The implied forecast of future yield shifts can be calculated more
formally as:
ΔYtþ1 ¼ 1þ Δrentð Þ1þ Δcapitalð Þ  1
 
(2)
Where
ΔYtþ1 is the one period ahead implied yield shift in percentage terms
Δrent is the one period ahead forecasted rate of rental growth
Δcapital is the one period ahead forecasted rate of capital growth
For example, if the current yield is 5%, the one year ahead rental growth forecast
is 20% and the capital growth forecast is 9%, the implied forecast of the relative
yield shift in a year’s time is (1.20/1.09) −1 = 0.1009 (10.09%) and the yield is
forecasted to increase to 5.5% (0.1009*0.05 + 0.05).
Given that at the index level negligible variation in average reversionary period would
be expected, expected or actual differences in vacancy levels could also produce changes
in expected or actual capital growth. In the past, changes in vacancy rates seemed to have
had limited impact on capital growth shifts. Ranging from an upward shift of 210 basis
8 P. MCALLISTER AND I. NASE
points in 2008 to a downward shift of 75 basis points in 2010, on average the actual MSCI
All Property Equivalent Yield series has by shifted 53 basis points every year since 2005.
An implied series of equivalent yield shifts estimated from actual changes in rental
growth and capital growth alone are closely aligned to the actual equivalent yield shifts.
There is an average difference between the actual and implied yield shift of seven basis
points per annum. This suggests that forecasts of capital growth would largely be
a product of rental and yield forecasts. However, where capital growth forecasts are
low, it is possible that they may reflect expectations of fluctuations in vacancy rates
instead of or as well as expected yield shifts and rental growth. In addition, it should be
noted that the MSCI Equivalent Yield time series is based upon a changing sample of
properties. However, its Equivalent Yield Shift time series is based upon a ‘held’ sample.
Put simply, a small part of the yield shift will also be due to changing sample composition
rather than market change. As such, implied forecasts of small yield shifts based only on
the relationship between rental and capital growth forecasts should be treated with
caution.
V Results and findings
Table 1 displays the summary statistics for the (consensus) forecasted and actual out-
comes for the one year ahead forecasts. The summary data provides preliminary evidence
of a pessimism bias in the forecasts. With few exceptions, the mean forecast over the
whole period for all sectors and variables forecasted is lower than the actual outcome. This
pessimism bias is less clear for the implied equivalent yield shift forecasts. The broad
retail sector (incorporating standard shops, shopping centres and retail warehouses) has
been the worst performing in terms of capital growth, rental growth and total returns
with City and West End Offices performing best. This pattern is also found in the
forecasts.
The evidence on forecast smoothing is more mixed. For rental growth, the standard
deviation of the forecasted and actual growth rates are similar with the forecasted series
displaying slightly higher volatility on average. This is not in line with expectations.
Whilst the standard deviations were similar, for all sectors the consensus forecasts
systematically underestimated the peak of the market whilst overestimating its lowest
point over the sample period. The ‘cancelling out’ effect caused by the under-estimation
of the upside variance combined with the over-estimation of the downside variance
resulted in similar levels of volatility in the times series for the actual rental growth rates
and forecasted rental growth rates. For capital growth, there is some evidence of forecast
smoothing. For all sectors, the standard deviation of the forecasted capital returns is
lower than the actual capital returns. This is reflected in the forecasts of the market peaks
and troughs. For all sectors, the consensus forecasts systematically underestimated the
peak and the low point of the market cycle. This pattern is largely replicated for the total
return forecasts.
Bearing in mind that positive yield shifts reflect decreases in capital values, the
interpretation of positive and negative figures is the opposite as for the other variables.
The forecasted yield shifts are typically more optimistic than the actual. For All Property,
the mean forecasted Equivalent Yield Shift is 1.2 whilst the actual is 1.6 indicating that the
consensus expectation was for lower increases in yields. The standard deviation of the
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forecasted and actual equivalent yields are broadly similar. However, the forecasted series
displays consistently higher volatility than the actual series on average. Finally, whilst the
sample time frame provides a fairly small number of annual observations, the results for
serial correlation provide little evidence to indicate that forecasters tend to be more
‘sticky’ in their forecasts compared to the index. For all sectors and all of the variables, the
level of serial correlation in the forecasted time series is generally lower for the forecasted
series than for the actual series.
Error metric measures of forecast accuracy
Table 2 presents the results for the conventional error metric tests of forecasting accuracy
for consensus and the ARMA models. The Mean Error is essentially a measure of
forecasting bias. For rental growth, the results are consistent with the analysis above
that identified a systematic tendency for the consensus forecast to be more pessimistic
than the actual outcome for all sectors. However, it should be noted that there are specific
periods, such as 2008, when the consensus forecasts were optimistic and underestimated
Table 2. Forecasting accuracy: Error metrics.
Consensus Forecast ARMA
ME MAE RMSE ME MAE RMSE
Rental value growth (% p.a.)
OFFICES −1.5 3.0 3.5 0.5 4.2 6.2
INDUSTRIAL −1.0 1.3 1.7 1.9 3.0 3.5
STANDARD SHOPS −1.4 1.4 1.6 3.5 3.5 4.7
SHOPPING CENTRES −0.6 0.9 1.2 4.6 4.6 5.1
RETAIL WAREHOUSE −0.1 1.0 1.2 4.9 4.9 5.4
ALL PROPERTY −1.0 1.7 1.9 2.6 2.9 4.2
City Offices −2.6 4.8 5.5 −1.2 6.7 8.8
West End Offices −2.3 4.5 6.0 −0.2 7.1 9.8
Capital value growth (% p.a.)
OFFICES −1.7 8.1 9.5 −0.1 8.9 11.7
INDUSTRIAL −2.1 7.5 9.1 0.9 8.5 11.4
STANDARD SHOPS −2.2 6.5 7.8 2.8 6.8 10.0
SHOPPING CENTRES 0.2 5.3 7.1 4.8 8.2 11.3
RETAIL WAREHOUSE 0.9 7.3 10.4 7.0 8.7 13.2
ALL PROPERTY −1.2 6.8 8.5 2.3 7.4 10.5
City Offices −2.8 10.2 11.4 −1.6 10.6 13.2
West End Offices −4.0 9.9 11.2 −1.5 9.9 12.9
Total return (% p.a.)
OFFICES −1.3 8.0 9.8 1.4 9.2 12.2
INDUSTRIAL −1.9 7.6 9.5 3.0 8.9 12.3
STANDARD SHOPS −1.9 6.5 7.9 3.6 7.2 10.6
SHOPPING CENTRES 0.8 5.1 7.3 5.7 8.8 12.2
RETAIL WAREHOUSE 0.9 7.5 10.7 8.5 9.5 14.7
ALL PROPERTY −0.9 6.8 8.7 3.5 7.6 11.3
City Offices −2.4 10.2 11.6 −0.1 10.8 13.6
West End Offices −3.9 10.0 11.4 0.4 10.0 13.2
Equivalent Yield Shift (% p.a.)
OFFICES −0.2 9.9 13.5 −0.6 8.5 12.1
INDUSTRIAL −0.3 10.4 14.4 −0.3 8.6 12.9
STANDARD SHOPS −0.7 8.8 13.3 −0.6 7.9 11.6
SHOPPING CENTRES −1.5 7.9 12.4 −2.4 7.8 12.8
RETAIL WAREHOUSE 0.3 11.9 18.4 −3.3 9.4 14.7
ALL PROPERTY −0.4 9.4 13.7 −1.3 8.1 12.3
City Offices −0.1 9.1 12.7 −0.5 9.2 12.3
West End Offices 0.1 9.2 14.1 −0.2 8.8 11.8
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the extent of the market fall. Given the low rates of nominal rental growth in the sample
period, the Mean Absolute Error in the rental forecast is typically higher than the actual
rate of rental growth. The potential scaling problem can be seen in that the Mean and
Mean Absolute Errors tend to be higher when the actual rate of growth is higher. Hence,
the West End Office and City Office consensus forecasts had the highest levels of
inaccuracy. In contrast, the ARMA forecasts were generally optimistic. For instance, in
the consensus forecasts the ME for All Property was −1.0%. For the ARMA forecasts, the
equivalent figure was 2.6%. A lot of the error in the ARMA models was in the retail
sectors where the ARMA models performed particularly poorly.
Turning to capital growth forecasts, the level of Mean Error of the consensus forecast
is broadly similar to rental growth. The most notable result is the size of the Mean
Absolute Error. For instance, All Property had an average rate of capital growth of 2% per
annum in the sample period. Forecasters were systematically pessimistic producing
a Mean Error of −1.2% with the actual being higher than the forecasted. However, the
average difference between the achieved capital growth and the forecasted capital growth
in any given year was 6.8%. For the whole sample period, this average figure was highest
for City Offices at 10.3%. It peaked in 2008 with the average difference between the actual
and forecasted rate of capital growth at 20%. Again, the ARMA models were generally
optimistic. For instance, in the consensus forecasts the ME for All Property Capital
Growth was −1.2%. For the ARMA
forecasts, the equivalent figure was 2.3%. Whilst usually higher in terms of MAE, the
ARMA forecasts had similar levels of forecasting performance as the consensus forecasts.
For the equivalent yield shift forecasts, the level of Mean Error looks small compared
to rental and capital growth, except for shopping centres. The results do not indicate
significant bias in the implied consensus forecasts of equivalent yield shift. Whilst the
yield shift forecasts for most sectors were more optimistic than the actual, the large yield
forecasting errors in the 2007–2009 period produced this result. The ARMA conditional
mean forecasts had much higher levels of Mean Error compared to the consensus. Again,
the most notable result in the consensus forecasts is the size of the Mean Absolute Error.
The average difference between the actual equivalent yield and the forecasted equivalent
yield in any given year was approximately 0.5%. The effect of such an error on capital
growth depends on the equivalent yield at the start of the forecasting period. For instance,
a 0.5% downward equivalent yield shift from 4.5% to 4% would, all else equal, produce an
increase in capital value of approximately 12.5%. The comparative increase if the starting
equivalent yield were 6% is 8.3%. The ARMA models preformed much more poorly in
terms of Mean Error. For instance, in the consensus forecasts the ME for All Property
Equivalent Yield was −0.4. For the ARMA forecasts, the corresponding figure was −1.3%.
In terms of MAE, the ARMA forecasts had similar but consistently lower levels of error
relative to the consensus forecasts.
The discussion above has hinted at the fact that forecasting uncertainty may be
concentrated in certain periods and that there may be variations in the reliability of
forecasts in different market conditions. Figures 1–3 display the actual and forecasted
rental growth, capital growth and equivalent yield shift figures for the All Property Index.
It is clear that the largest forecasting errors occurred during the Global Financial Crisis.
As the downturn started in 2007, the one year ahead forecast implied minimal change in
the equivalent yield. The All Property equivalent yield rose from 5.4% to 6.1%. As the
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downturn intensified in 2008, the consensus forecast was for an increase in the equivalent
yield from 6.1% to 6.7%. All else equal, this yield shift would result in a capital growth of
approximately −9%. This proved to be a considerable underestimation of the actual yield
shift with the All Property Equivalent Yield rising to 8.2%. In reality, the yield shift itself
produced a fall in capital values of around −25%. The consensus forecast anticipated that
the market would continue to deteriorate in 2009 with the All Property Equivalent Yield
rising to 8.9%. In fact, there was a degree of market stabilisation with the All Property
equivalent yield falling from 8.2% to 8.0%. In terms of the total Mean Absolute Error in
the equivalent yield forecasts over the whole 13 year period, the years 2007, 2008 and
2009 account for approximately 72% of the forecasting error. The comparable figure for
rental growth is 42%. If errors were spread equally, it would be expected that this period
would account for around 23% of the total forecast error.
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Figure 1. All Property – Rental growth.
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Figure 2. All Property – Capital growth.
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Forecasts of relative performance
We now turn to the relative measures of forecasting performance of the various sectors.
Figures 4 and 5 display the Kendall’s W Coefficient of Concordance (equation 1) for the
various performance metrics over the sample period. Figure 4 shows results for the
comparison between actual and consensus forecasts and Figure 5 shows the results for
the comparison between actual and ARMAmodel forecasts. Broadly, in contrast to Ling’s
(2005) findings in the US for the RERC survey, the results suggest that the consensus
forecasts display a high degree of reliability in forecasting the relative performance of the
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Figure 3. All property equivalent yield shift.
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Figure 4. Coefficient of concordance in sector ranking for consensus forecasts.
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various sectors. In the vast majority of cases, there is little ‘disagreement’ between the
actual sector ranking and the forecasted sector ranking. For rental growth, capital growth
and total return, in 60%-70% of observations, the forecasted ranking was the same as or
different by one rank from the actual rank.
It is difficult to reconcile the stark contrast between the findings of Ling’s study in the
US published in 2005 and these current findings for the UK. A key difference between the
two studies is the composition of the survey samples. The US study is based upon
a survey of institutional investors and managers whilst the IPF Consensus Forecasts
are based on a survey of specialist professional forecasters. Investors may tend to anchor
on past real estate market performance whilst forecasters may be more inclined to anchor
on forecasted variables e.g. GDP or inflation forecasts. However, the investor expecta-
tions survey by RERC may also have been influenced by real estate forecasts and that
forecasters as well as investors display adaptive expectations. Finally, it is also possible
that the difference in findings may be due to cultural differences between UK and US
markets.
Again the consensus forecasts for equivalent yield shifts were less reliable. The
comparable figure for the equivalent yield forecasts is approximately 40% of the fore-
casted rankings being the same as or different by one rank from the actual rank. Once
more, there are variations in the level of forecast reliability over time. Consistent with the
findings above, the forecasts of equivalent yield displayed their lowest correlation with
the actual rankings during the Global Financial Crisis. There was actually a negative
(Spearman’s Rank) correlation coefficient between the sector rankings in terms of
equivalent yields and the actual sector ranking of equivalent yields in six of the
13 years. However, it is notable that this did not typically result in poor relative forecast
performance for total returns or capital growth. In periods when there was poor
performance in sector ranking of equivalent yields (e.g. in 2007, 2008, 2010 and 2103),
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Figure 5. Coefficient of concordance in sector ranking for ARMA Forecasts.
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there was not necessarily poor forecasting performance in ranking sectors in terms of
total return and/or capital growth. A clear-cut finding is that the conditional mean
ARMA forecasts tend to perform much more poorly in terms of predicting the relative
performance of the various sectors.
The final evaluation of the consensus forecasts assesses their performance relative to
simple (so-called naïve) forecasts and ARMAmodels via Theil’s inequality coefficient (U2).
Additionally, for both consensus and ARMA forecasts we investigate the source of the
forecast error by decomposing the U2 coefficient into bias, variance and covariance
proportions. The results are displayed in Table 3. Consistent with the analysis above,
consensus rental growth forecasts tend to display the best performance. The RMSE of the
consensus forecasts of rental growth is typically just over half the naïve forecasts. In
contrast, the conditional mean ARMA forecasts tend to be beaten by naïve predictions.
The decomposition of the error source indicates that most problems lie with systematic
forecasting error in the three retail sectors. On the other hand, the error source in the
consensus forecasts is dominated by unsystematic forecasting error – the ‘least bad’ source
of forecasting error.
Table 3. Forecasting accuracy: Theil’s U2 statistic.
Consensus Forecasts ARMA Forecasts
Error source Error source
U2 stat bias variance covariance U2 stat bias variance covariance
Rental value growth (%)
OFFICES 0.51 19% 2% 79% 0.91 1% 97% 2%
INDUSTRIAL 0.56 37% 1% 62% 1.19 30% 51% 19%
STANDARD SHOPS 0.52 68% 2% 30% 1.47 55% 29% 16%
SHOPPING CENTRES 0.50 23% 5% 72% 2.21 82% 10% 8%
RETAIL WAREHOUSE 0.59 0% 45% 55% 2.54 83% 8% 9%
ALL PROPERTY 0.55 29% 8% 63% 1.19 38% 49% 13%
City Offices 0.57 23% 0% 77% 0.90 2% 97% 1%
West End Offices 0.55 14% 13% 73% 0.89 0% 100% 0%
Capital value growth (%)
OFFICES 0.80 3% 14% 83% 0.98 0% 100% 0%
INDUSTRIAL 0.81 5% 30% 65% 1.00 1% 94% 5%
STANDARD SHOPS 0.82 8% 20% 72% 1.05 8% 84% 8%
SHOPPING CENTRES 0.70 0% 32% 68% 1.12 18% 74% 8%
RETAIL WAREHOUSE 0.95 1% 16% 83% 1.21 28% 62% 10%
ALL PROPERTY 0.84 2% 14% 84% 1.04 5% 91% 4%
City Offices 0.83 6% 9% 85% 0.96 1% 99% 0%
West End Offices 0.78 12% 9% 79% 0.90 1% 99% 0%
Total return (%)
OFFICES 0.68 2% 17% 81% 0.85 1% 98% 1%
INDUSTRIAL 0.67 4% 34% 62% 0.86 6% 84% 10%
STANDARD SHOPS 0.67 6% 26% 68% 0.90 12% 80% 8%
SHOPPING CENTRES 0.65 1% 43% 56% 1.08 22% 69% 9%
RETAIL WAREHOUSE 0.87 1% 22% 77% 1.19 34% 55% 11%
ALL PROPERTY 0.70 1% 19% 80% 0.91 10% 84% 6%
City Offices 0.71 4% 11% 85% 0.83 0% 100% 0%
West End Offices 0.67 12% 10% 78% 0.77 0% 100% 0%
Equivalent Yield Shift
OFFICES 0.96 0% 3% 97% 1.01 0% 100% 0%
INDUSTRIAL 0.95 0% 3% 97% 1.02 0% 99% 1%
STANDARD SHOPS 0.93 0% 6% 94% 1.01 0% 99% 1%
SHOPPING CENTRES 0.85 1% 3% 96% 1.01 4% 94% 2%
RETAIL WAREHOUSE 1.02 0% 4% 96% 1.02 5% 93% 2%
ALL PROPERTY 0.94 0% 4% 96% 1.01 1% 99% 0%
City Offices 0.93 0% 1% 99% 1.00 0% 100% 0%
West End Offices 0.97 0% 4% 96% 1.01 0% 100% 0%
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Turning to capital growth, whilst all sectors beat the naïve prediction, the consensus
forecasts display weaker performance compared to consensus rental growth forecasts.
The ARMA capital growth forecasts improve compared to their rental growth counter-
parts. They broadly match the performance of the naïve predictions. Even more so than
for rental growth, the error source in the consensus forecasts is dominated by unsyste-
matic forecasting error. In contrast, the major source of error in the ARMA forecasts is
an inability to capture the volatility of the times series. To a large extent, this is intrinsic to
the ARMA forecasting model which does not condition upon variance.
Throughout the paper, the forecasting performance for total returns has not been
discussed in detail because it tends to be approximately between the forecasting perfor-
mance of capital and rental growth. This pattern holds in the U2 statistics for consensus
forecasts of total returns but not for the ARMA forecasts. In terms of error source in the
consensus forecasts, it is unsystematic forecast error that is the predominant cause of
forecast failure. For the ARMA forecasts, similar to rental and capital growth it is the
intrinsic inability to reflect the volatility of the time series that is the key determinant of
forecast error. For equivalent yield shift forecasts, there is little to distinguish the perfor-
mance of the naïve and consensus forecasts. A similar pattern can be seen for the ARMA
forecasts. However, in terms of error source, for consensus forecasts practically all forecast
error can be attributed to unsystematic factors. Whereas the dominant source of forecast
error in the ARMA is once again the inability to model the variance of the time series.
VI Conclusion
Evaluating forecast accuracy is an inherently subjective process. The extent to which
a failure to correctly predict the future is costly to the forecast user depends on a wide
range of factors. As a result, in the broader forecasting literature the identification of
appropriate measures of forecast accuracy in order to compare forecasters against each
other and in terms of their ability to improve decision-making has generated a large body
of analysis and discussion. However, in economic, business and financial market fore-
casting, it is generally accepted that forecasts will be prone to non-trivial errors, can
produce ‘forecasting debacles’ following major unanticipated shocks and can be prone to
systematic biases. The fact that previous research has found evidence of these phenomena
in real estate forecasts should be expected.
Many of the findings from this research are consistent with the results of previous
research. There was evidence of a systematic tendency towards pessimism. In line with
previous research, rental growth forecasts tend to be more reliable than capital growth
forecasts. Compared to capital growth, they have lower (mean absolute) error and
negligible difference in the volatility of forecasted and actual rental growth rates. It is
the typically large errors in capital growth forecasts that are then the source of most of the
error in total return forecasts. There is evidence of forecast smoothing here with the
forecasted capital growth time series exhibiting lower volatility than the actual capital
growth rates. However, it is also notable that the forecasts tend to display less serial
correlation than the actual series. Given that the main sources of error in capital growth
forecasts will be due to errors in the forecasts of rental growth and equivalent yield, the
relatively low (mean absolute) error in rental growth forecasts indicates that it must be
the error in the yield forecasts that is the guilty party.
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Whilst the IPF do not include forecasts of yields in the survey, it is failure in yield
forecasting that is the main source of failure in forecasts of capital growth and also in
forecasts of total return. With an average variation from the actual yield of 0.5%, the
consequence tends to be large errors in the estimation of capital growth. However, the
picture is more nuanced. The implicit yield forecasts inferred from rental and capital
growth forecasts display little evidence of forecast smoothing. The actual and forecasted
yield time series have similar levels of volatility. Much of the yield forecast error was
concentrated in the Global Financial Crisis. The period from 2007 to 2009 accounted for
approximately 60% of the total error in the forecasts of equivalent yield shift. In terms of
measuring relative sector performance, the equivalent yield forecasts also experienced
their worst performance in 2007 and 2008.
Whilst there has been little previous research on the issue, the findings indicate that
the consensus forecasts generally provide reliable indicators of the relative performance
of the sectors included in the survey. Although there are some years of comparatively
poor prediction of relative performance, for rental growth, capital growth and total
return, the forecasted sector rankings at the beginning of the year tend to be similar to
the outcome at the end of the year. Again, forecasted sector rankings for the equivalent
yield tended to have the least reliability. However, the focus here has been on one-year
ahead forecasts. Given the time scales involved in acquisition and disposal, the two and
five year horizons may be more appropriate for investors. The findings of the error
decomposition analysis provide some reassurance to forecasting practitioners. The vast
majority of the error source in consensus forecasts is in the unsystematic component
caused by random shocks. However, there is also evidence, particularly for rental growth,
that there is a conservative bias. On average, the consensus forecasts tended to be lower
than the actual outcome for all sectors across the study period.
Finally, it is with some caution that we turn to the practical implications of these
findings. To paraphrase Niels Bohr, it is difficult to predict the commercial real estate
market, especially market yields. This weakness in yield forecasting is transmitted directly
to capital growth forecasts. Forecast users can place much more confidence in rental
growth predictions but it is also worth bearing in mind that the consensus forecasts have
been systematically pessimistic about this variable. The main challenge for producers of
commercial real estate forecasts is yield shifts which are more closely related to the more
volatile capital markets (compared to the relatively ‘sticky’ real economy). Predictability is
likely to stay lower for yields. The most recent research incorporating a range of sentiment
indicators into yield forecasting models has found little improvement in forecasting
performance compared to more established and even naïve models (see Heinig, Nanda,
& Tsolacos, forthcoming). The performance of real estate forecasts during the GFC
particularly highlighted the need for users of forecasts to place less weight on them in
periods of market volatility.
Notes
1. The Investment Property Forum (IPF) is a London based individual members organisation
with a 2000+ diverse membership including investment agents, fund managers, bankers,
lawyers, researchers, academics, actuaries and other related professionals operating in the
UK property investment market.
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2. The terms ‘yield’, ‘equivalent yield’ and ‘capitalisation rate’ should be regarded as effectively
interchangeable in this context. ‘Equivalent yield’, which is mainly used in the UK and
Ireland, incorporates particular attributes of the typical lease structures. Throughout the
paper, the term ‘equivalent yield’ is used.
3. Whilst investment banks, advisors and institutional investors have been the three main
categories, not all contributors fit into these categories. In particular, a small number of
specialist forecasting organisations have participated e.g. Capital Economics, Real Estate
Forecasting Limited. In addition, over the last decade the participation of investment banks
has decreased. In 2019, the asset management arm of UBS was the only investment bank
participating.
4. For instance, several years ago, one former forecaster for a global real estate advisory firm
informed one of the authors that they had been successfully pressured by one of the firm’s
leading investment agents to change an initial forecast for City of London office rents
because it might result in a buyer withdrawing from a large deal.
5. It should be noted the Equivalent Yield Shift is measured in relative terms by MSCI. For
instance, if the yield at t = 0 is 5% and at t = 1 it increases to 5.5%, the equivalent yield shift is
calculated as (0.055–0.05)/0.05*100 = 10. This effectively represents a 10% increase in the
yield relative to the reference year. In absolute terms, the equivalent yield shift is 0.5% since
the equivalent yield increases from 5% to 5.5% .
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.
Notes on contributors
Pat McAllister is a professor of Real Estate at the Department of Real Estate and Planning,
University of Reading. His research interests are focused on international real estate investment,
valuation and real estate development.
Ilir Nase is an assistant professor (Real Estate Management) at the Department of Management in
the Built Environment, Delft University of Technology. His main areas of research activity include
real estate and urban economics, the interface of urban planning/design and real estate develop-
ment and corporate real estate management.
References
Batchelor, R. (2007). Bias in macroeconomic forecasts. International Journal of Forecasting, 23(2),
189–203.
Baym, A., & Hartzell, D. (2012). Global property investment: Strategies, structures, decisions.
Chichester: Wiley.
Bond, S., & Mitchell, P. (2011). The information content of real estate derivative prices. Journal of
Portfolio Management, 37(5), 170–181. (Special Real Estate Issue).
Box, G. E., Hunter, W. G., & Hunter, J. S. (1978). Statistics for experimenters. New York, NY: John
Wiley & Sons.
Chaplin, R. (1998). An ex-post comparative evaluation of office rent prediction models. Journal of
Property Valuation & Investment, 16, 21–37.
Chaplin, R. (2000). Predicting real estate rents: Walking backwards into the future. Journal of
Property Investment and Finance, 18, 352–370.
Clements, M., & Hendry, D. (1999). Forecasting Non-stationary Economic Time Series. Boston,
MA: MIT Press.
JOURNAL OF PROPERTY RESEARCH 19
Gallimore, P., & McAllister, P. (2003). Judgment and quantitative forecasts in commercial property
investment decisions. London, UK: Report for RICS Education Trust.
Gallimore, P., & McAllister, P. (2005). Expert judgement in the processes of commercial property
market forecasting. Journal of Property Research, 21, 337–360.
Granger, C., & Pesaran, M. (2000). Economic and statistical measures of forecast accuracy. Journal
of Forecasting, 19, 537–560.
Heinig, S., Nanda, A., & Tsolacos, S. (forthcoming). Which sentiment indicators matter? Evidence
from the European commercial real estate market. Journal of Real Estate Research.
Hendry, D. F. (2003). Forecasting pitfalls. Bulletin EU and US inflation and macroeconomic
analysis (BIMA). 100, 65–82.
Hendry, D. F., & Clements, M. P. (2003). Economic forecasting: Some lessons from recent
research. Economic Modelling, 20(2), 301–329.
Ling, D. (2005). A random walk downMain Street: Can experts predict returns on commercial real
estate? Journal of Real Estate Research, 27, 137–154.
Marcato, G., & Nanda, A. (2016). Information content and forecasting ability of sentiment
indicators: Case of real estate market. Journal of Real Estate Research, 38(2), 165–203.
McAllister, P., Newell, G., & Matysiak, G. (2006). Disagreement and uncertainty in UK commercial
property market forecast: Research findings. London, UK: Report for Investment Property
Forum.
McAllister, P., Newell, G., & Matysiak, G. (2008). Agreement and accuracy in consensus forecasts
of the UK commercial property market. Journal of Property Research, 25, 1–22.
Nordhaus, W. (1987). Forecasting efficiency: Concepts and applications. Review of Economics and
Statistics, 69, 667–674.
Papastamos, D., Matysiak, G., & Stevenson, S. (2015). Assessing the accuracy and dispersion of real
estate investment forecasts. International Review of Financial Analysis, 42, 141–152.
Perera, T., Higgins, D., & Wong, W. W. (2018). The evaluation of the Australian office market
forecast accuracy. Journal of Property Investment & Finance, 36(3), 259–272.
Stevenson, S., & McGarth, O. (2003). A comparison of alternative rental forecasting models:
Empirical tests on the London office market. Journal of Property Research, 20(3), 235–260.
Theil, H. (1966). Applied economic forecasting. Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company.
Tsolacos, S. (2006). An assessment of property performance forecasts: Consensus versus e
conometric. Journal of Property Investment & Finance, 24(5), 386–399.
Watkins, C., White, M., & Keskin, B. (2012). The future of property forecasting. London, UK:
Investment Property Forum.
Wilson, P., Okunev, J., Ellis, C., & Higgins, D. (2000). Comparing Univariate Forecasting
Techniques in Property Markets. Journal of Real Estate Portfolio Management, 6(3), 283–306.
20 P. MCALLISTER AND I. NASE
Appendix 1. Independent and Relative Measures of Forecast Performance
Commonly, forecast error is measured as the difference between actual outcome and forecasted
outcome. In more formal notation, this can be expressed as
et ¼ Ft  At (3)
Where et represents the forecast error, At is the actual outcome and Ft is the forecasted outcome.
For a series of forecasts, the Mean Error (ME) measures the average difference between the actual
and forecasted outcomes. It is a simple and frequently used measure of forecast accuracy. As
negative and positive errors cancel each other out, it is a measure of bias – whether there is
a systematic tendency for forecasts to be over or under-estimated. For a set of N forecasts, it can be
expressed more formally as
ME ¼ 1
N
XN
t¼1 et (4)
Given that positive and negative errors can cancel each other out, the ME metric can mask
substantial forecasting inaccuracy. It provides no indication of the variance in the errors with
the possibility that lots of the individual errors could be large. The Mean Absolute Error (MAE)
overcomes this limitation by providing the average error regardless of whether it is positive or
negative.
MAE ¼ 1
N
XN
t¼1 etj j (5)
A commonly used alternative to the MAE is the Mean Squared Error (MSE). Whilst similar to the
MAE, it puts a larger penalty on large forecast errors than the MAE.
MSE ¼ 1
N
XN
t¼1 e
2
t (6)
The square root of the MSE (typically labelled RMSE – root mean squared error) is also
a commonly used forecast accuracy metric. The RMSE is sometimes preferred to the MSE as it
is on the same scale as the data. It is the square root of the average of squared errors. The effect of
each error on RMSE is proportional to the size of the squared error; thus larger errors have
a disproportionately large effect on RMSE with the result that the RMSE is sensitive to outliers.
This is a weakness and a strength in that large errors can be the most harmful from the perspective
of forecast users. However, at the same time, the effects of unpredictable major shocks may be
given undue weight.
Turning to relative measures of forecast performance, as stated above, a weakness of error
metrics that use the same scale as the forecasted variables measures is that it is difficult to
compare them across variables. A range of methods have been suggested to surmount this
problem that involve normalising the values. A common approach to dealing with the scaling
issue is to divide the forecast error by the forecast error obtained using another method of
forecasting. Partially to overcome scaling issues, we evaluate the forecasts using Theil’s U2
statistic. This statistic is commonly a measure of the naïve time series model (e.g. same as
last year). The main rationale is based upon an expectation that forecasters should be able to
outperform simple models.
U2 ¼
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
1
N
PN
t¼1 Ft  Atð Þ2
q
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
1
N
PN
t¼1 Atð Þ2
q (7)
Where, following Theil’s (1966) notation, Ft and At are pairs of predicted and realised changes of
any given time series. In particular, in interpreting Theil’s U2-statistic:
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● U = 1 indicates the naïve forecasting method is as good as the forecasting technique being
evaluated
● U < 1 indicates the forecasting technique being evaluated is better than the naïve forecasting
method
● U > 1 indicates the forecasting technique being evaluated is worse than the naïve forecasting
method.
Typically the naïve forecasting method used in calculating Theil’s U2-statistic is the ‘same as last
period’ forecasting strategy, in which the previous actual annual return is used as the real estate
forecast for the subsequent annual period. Theil’s U2 statistic can be decomposed into three parts –
bias, variance and covariance proportions (see Theil, 1966). The bias proportion measures how far
the mean of the forecast is from the mean of the actual series. Hence, it measures the percentage of
the forecast error that is caused by systematic forecasting error. The variance proportion repre-
sents the ability of the forecasts to reproduce the degree of variability in the actual outcomes. It
measures the percentage of the forecast error that is caused by failure to capture the volatility of the
actual. Finally, the covariance proportion measures the remaining unsystematic forecasting errors.
The quality of the forecast is judged according to the relative sizes of the bias and variance
proportions (the smaller the better) so that most of the forecast error should be in the covariance
proportion.
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Appendix 3. ARMA forecasts
ARMA forecasts 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Rental value growth (%)
OFFICES 3.58 3.88 3.92 2.81 2.63 3.56 2.94 2.77 2.93 3.11 3.16 2.98
INDUSTRIAL 3.61 3.51 3.48 3.18 2.81 3.06 2.76 2.63 2.60 2.67 2.67 2.58
STANDARD SHOPS 5.46 5.42 5.30 4.85 3.94 4.72 4.20 3.93 3.89 4.08 3.93 3.85
SHOPPING CENTRES 6.06 5.80 6.04 4.83 4.56 4.92 4.51 4.27 4.24 4.14 4.17 3.85
RETAIL WAREHOUSE 6.27 6.11 5.93 5.62 4.90 4.97 4.90 4.71 4.52 4.44 4.37 4.26
ALL PROPERTY 4.56 4.57 4.58 3.85 3.58 4.18 3.64 3.43 3.44 3.48 3.44 3.27
City Offices 2.91 3.76 3.75 2.44 2.13 3.37 2.71 2.76 2.87 3.26 3.43 3.17
West End Offices 4.84 5.38 5.43 4.09 3.96 5.17 4.34 4.14 4.39 4.60 4.68 4.50
Capital value growth (%)
OFFICES 2.99 3.42 2.70 2.16 2.64 2.34 1.95 1.98 2.33 2.63 2.72 2.97
INDUSTRIAL 3.73 4.01 3.46 2.67 2.90 2.47 2.27 2.10 2.33 2.67 2.74 3.26
STANDARD SHOPS 5.39 5.51 4.84 3.99 4.42 4.11 3.80 3.69 3.86 4.04 4.14 4.18
SHOPPING CENTRES 4.73 4.99 4.35 3.43 3.64 3.59 2.87 2.86 2.91 3.06 2.96 2.85
RETAIL WAREHOUSE 7.28 7.42 6.96 5.64 5.97 5.56 5.37 5.10 5.08 5.12 4.92 4.67
ALL PROPERTY 4.20 4.52 3.89 3.24 3.62 3.21 2.88 2.83 3.01 3.18 3.17 3.31
City Offices 2.90 3.57 2.41 1.83 2.43 2.47 2.01 2.19 2.61 2.97 3.20 3.40
West End Offices 4.86 5.59 4.70 4.11 4.86 4.76 4.21 4.47 4.80 5.17 5.25 5.40
Total return (%)
OFFICES 9.96 10.34 9.63 9.05 9.48 9.08 8.68 8.69 8.99 9.24 9.30 9.14
INDUSTRIAL 12.57 12.74 12.09 11.14 11.40 10.86 10.62 10.39 10.60 10.92 10.91 10.86
STANDARD SHOPS 11.39 11.51 10.86 10.00 10.38 10.02 9.72 9.61 9.76 9.91 9.98 9.84
SHOPPING CENTRES 11.15 11.36 10.73 9.75 9.96 9.85 9.12 9.11 9.14 9.27 9.13 8.98
RETAIL WAREHOUSE 14.87 14.93 14.18 12.79 13.22 12.76 12.53 12.22 12.18 12.20 11.95 11.66
ALL PROPERTY 11.07 11.33 10.70 9.98 10.34 9.85 9.52 9.44 9.60 9.74 9.70 9.58
City Offices 9.48 10.08 8.94 8.32 8.86 8.81 8.34 8.50 8.88 9.19 9.37 9.07
West End Offices 11.56 12.24 11.34 10.72 11.42 11.20 10.63 10.85 11.11 11.41 11.43 11.21
Equivalent Yield
OFFICES 8.16 8.01 8.12 8.26 7.99 7.94 8.00 7.91 7.82 7.70 7.75 7.61
INDUSTRIAL 8.96 7.49 8.89 9.61 9.48 9.40 9.36 9.35 9.22 8.98 8.82 8.69
STANDARD SHOPS 6.90 6.69 6.96 7.06 6.93 6.89 6.88 6.87 6.81 6.74 6.65 6.57
SHOPPING CENTRES 7.89 7.60 7.92 8.36 8.20 7.95 7.98 7.91 7.85 7.67 7.61 7.54
RETAIL WAREHOUSE 7.31 6.83 7.53 8.10 7.71 7.57 7.55 7.58 7.49 7.33 7.29 7.37
ALL PROPERTY 7.94 7.72 7.94 8.16 7.93 7.86 7.82 7.82 7.73 7.61 7.53 7.49
City Offices 7.49 7.43 7.50 7.56 7.43 7.39 7.38 7.38 7.30 7.26 7.18 7.16
West End Offices 7.88 7.64 7.80 7.91 7.63 7.50 7.39 7.29 7.16 6.89 6.78 6.86
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